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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Richard Glenn Morris (hereinafter, Richard) appeals from his judgment dated 
March 20, 2014. He asserts that the district court erred by denying his motion to 
suppress. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
On August 1, 2012, Officer James Cromwell, a police officer for the City of Boise 
initiated a traffic stop. Richard, the driver was stopped in the vicinity of Latah and 
Overland Streets. Officer Cromwell testified his vehicle's two right side tires crossed the 
white fog line. He suspected Richard was operating his vehicle while impaired. 
(Preliminary Hearing Transcript Page 7, Lines 17-18, Motion To Suppress Transcript 
Page 14, Lines 5-10). 
A motion to suppress evidence was held on December 14, 2012. Officer 
Cromwell testified he was driving along when he first noticed Richard's vehicle. He 
stopped Richard at 1 :37 a.m. (Motion To Suppress Transcript Page 30, Lines 3-5). He 
said he smelled marijuana from inside Richard's vehicle. An assist officer with a drug-
sniffing dog arrived about 1:42 a.m. (Motion To Suppress Transcript Page 43, Lines 8-
12). Officer Cromwell determined Richard was a probationer, so he contacted an on call 
probation officer to obtain authority to search. 
A second police officer testified, Officer Plaisted. He was an assist officer with a 
dog. He said Officer Cromwell requested dispatch for an assist officer and a dog 
contemporaneously with Richard's traffic stop. (Motion To Suppress Transcript Page 56, 
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Lines 2-8). He provided precise information about times by referring to a printout used 
by law enforcement to track officer's whereabouts and duties. 
A third witness testified at the motion to suppress hearing. She worked as a 
probation officer for the Idaho Department of Corrections. Ms. Lockner, said she was an 
on-call officer the night Richard was stopped. She entered information into a work 
database from Officer Cromwell's request to search. She said Cromwell had him pulled 
over and he had come from a known drug house. (Motion To Suppress Transcript Page 
63, Lines 4-10). Officer Cromwell denied he saw him leave a known drug house, and 
that was not why he pulled him over. (Motion To Suppress Transcript Page 36, Lines 23-
24). 
Richard testified at the suppression hearing. He said his vehicle traveled in 
between the yellow line and the white line in the middle of the road only. (Motion To 
Suppress Transcript Page 75, Lines 19-22). Two exhibits were admitted that 
demonstrated differently configured roadways. The first was a road with a normal white 
fog line, and the other had an additional white line designated as a bike lane. Richard 
described the road where he was stopped was similar to the picture in exhibit "C", 
because there was a bike lane. (Motion To Suppress Transcript Page 71, Lines 18-24). 
Richard said Officer Cromwell told him he stopped him because his vehicle tires crossed 
over a white line. (Motion To Suppress Transcript Page 91, Lines 13-16). 
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Did The District Court Err By Denying Richard's Motion To Suppress? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
The District Court Erred By Denying The Motion To Suppress 
A. Introduction 
Prior to trial, Richard filed a motion to suppress, asserting that his right to be free 
from warrantless searches and seizures had been violated. The district court denied his 
motion. It held that there was reasonable articulable suspicion supporting the traffic stop. 
(R., p. 119) Richard went to jury trial and was convicted of Possession of A Controlled 
Substance, Misdemeanor, a lesser-included offense. (R., p. 189) 
B. Standard Of Review 
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision on 
a motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court will accept the trial court's 
findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but there is free review of the 
application of constitutional principles to the facts as found. State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 
559,561, 916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct. App. 1996). At a suppression hearing, the power to 
assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw 
factual inferences is vested in the trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina, 127 Idaho 102, 106, 
897 P.2d 993, 997 (1995); State v. Schevers, 132 Idaho 786, 789, 979 P.2d 659, 662 (Ct. 
App. 1999). 
C. The District Court Erred By Denying The Motion To Suppress 
The district court stated in the order denying the motion to suppress, that it did not 
matter whether Richard's vehicle crossed over a line separating a road from a parking 
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space or a bike path. (R. p. 117) Either crossing would constitute reasonable articulable 
suspicion under two Idaho Code Sections: Idaho Code Section 49-630 or Idaho Code 
Section 49-63 7. Idaho Code Section 49-630 (I) reads as follows: 
Upon all highways of sufficient width a vehicle shall be driven upon the right half 
of the roadway. 
Section 49-63 7 (1) reads as follows: 
Whenever any highway has been divided into two (2) or more clearly marked 
lanes for traffic the following, in addition to all else, shall apply: A vehicle shall 
be driven as nearly as practicable entirely within a single lane and shall not be 
moved from that lane until the driver has first ascertained that the movement can 
be made with safety. 
Richard's trial counsel argued these statutes are in conflict, because the language of Idaho 
Code 49-637 (1) includes the phrase "as nearly as practicable entirely within a single 
lane". He questioned whether the crossing of a white line on the right hand side of the 
road represented a violation under Idaho Code Section 49-637(1). At the hearing he 
established the white line was an edge of a bike path as opposed to a fog line. He argued 
the "nearly as practicable" language widened the possible circumstances where a lane 
deviation may not amount to an infraction. He reasoned an ambiguity between the two 
statutes should be construed in favor of the accused. 
Trial counsel also argued the crossing of a white line falls within a range of 
"normal driving activity". State v. Emory, 119 Idaho 661,809 P. 2d 522 (Ct. App. 1991). 
The Emory ease contemplated an officer's decision to stop a driver who on a Saturday 
night at around 3:00 a.m., was slow to respond to a traffic signal and whose vehicle came 
close to striking other parked vehicles. The stop was based upon suspicion of 
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impairment. Under the totality of the circumstances the Court held the officer lacked the 
objective facts necessary to legitimately stop the vehicle. The Court described the 
driver's conduct as falling within a broad range of what could be described as normal 
driving behavior. Id. at 525. The district court's denial of a motion to suppress was 
reversed. 
Trial counsel implied Richard's two wheels crossing over a white line designating 
a bike lane did not provide a reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity to 
support a stop. It was not necessarily a violation of the law if Richard was maintaining 
his lane as nearly as practicable. The district court rejected this argument, by citing 
another Idaho case involving a different driver who was stopped for crossing over a white 
line. In that case the officer knew driver had a pending drug case. He suspected driver 
was engaged in drug manufacturing and distribution. The officer witnessed his vehicle 
tires pass over a white line while entering an on-ramp for a highway. The officer also 
noticed the driver was operating his vehicle at variable speeds below the posted limit. 
The Court reasoned the lane violation was a legitimate single reason to stop the driver; 
his vehicle had driven on the shoulder instead of the roadway as it entered the highway. 
Idaho v. Slater, 135 Idaho 293, 32 P. 3d. 685,689 (Ct App. 2001). 1 
Richard's response is crossing a white line designating a bike lane is not the same 
thing as crossing a fog line. A slight crossing of a bike lane does not represent leaving 
the roadway and entering a shoulder. Moreover, a single and slight deviation from the 
lane of travel falls within the normal range of driving behavior. This did not occur on an 
1 The Court stated there was a violation Idaho Code Section 49-630. 
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on-ramp where a vehicle would be increasing its speed in the direction of travel. The 
district court erred when it denied Richard's motion to suppress. 
Richard disagrees with the court's determination that there was substantial 
evidence upon which Officer Cromwell could be deemed a credible witness. The district 
court addressed his credibility in its Order Denying The Motion To Suppress. The court 
found Officer Cromwell to be credible on the issue of the white line violation, due to: 1) 
The court's observation of his demeanor as he testified; 2) his truthful testimony that he 
followed Richard looking for traffic violations beyond what he had witnessed and saw 
none, and; 3) He told Richard after he was stopped why he pulled him over and it was for 
a white line violation. (R. Page 118). 
Richard disagrees with the court's conclusion regarding suppression. Ms. 
Lockner's testimony suggests Officer Cromwell's reason for stopping Richard was he left 
a known drug house. Richard believes the most important testimony was from Officer 
Plaisted. He said Officer Cromwell requested an assist officer with a drug dog at or near 
the time of the stop. Officer Cromwell testified the request for a dog was made after he 
smelled marijuana emanating from Richard's vehicle. The district court's concern in this 
close call case was the factual inaccuracy of Officer Cromwell's testimony. (R. 118) 
Regardless of the inaccuracy the court found him to be credible for the reasons stated 
above. 
Richard believes it is unreasonable to believe an officer would ask for a drug dog 
on a simple lane violation infraction. It is more reasonable to infer there was another 
reason for the stop. The court recognized that if there were surveillance of the house 
coupled with a lane violation then there wouldn't be a problem. However, Officer 
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Cromwell said he was driving along when he first noticed Richard's driving. He said did 
not know where he was prior to seeing him in traffic. Richard testified he maintained his 
lane. He also testified he told a detective he had left a residence on Latah Street. 
(Motion To Suppress Transcript, Page 85, Lines 9-10). 
The question before the Court is not whether the officer is being honest. The truth 
of the matter will always be subject to perspective. The question is whether there is 
substantial evidence to support the court's conclusion that the officer was credible. 
Richard argues there is not substantial evidence to support the district court's conclusion. 
Richard asks this Court to reverse the decision denying his motion to suppress. 
CONCLUSION 
Richard argues his alleged lane violation was not reasonable articulable suspicion 
of criminal activity. Furthermore, it was behavior falling under a wide spectrum of 
normal driving. Richard argues there is not substantial evidence supporting the legal 
justification for the stop in this case. An officer's word is typically more than adequate to 
establish reasonable suspicion by the applicable preponderance of the evidence burden of 
proof. It is uncommon for a defense attorney to establish a record that creates such a 
close call on a lane violation case. The district court recognized the inherent power of the 
trial court to weigh the facts and decided to find the testimony regarding a lane violation 
credible. Richard is asking this Court to do the opposite. 
The court cited a law review article during the motion to suppress hearing. 
(Motion To Suppress Transcript Page 112, Lines 6-7). Trial counsel cited a Ninth Circuit 
case in its briefing in support of its motion to suppress. There is debate over fog line 
violations being adequate cause as justification for a stop. They are easy to believe but 
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difficult to contest. This case is appropriate for relief. Richard asks this Court to 
overturn the district court's decision to deny the motion to suppress. 
DATED this 23rd day of July, 2014. 
Attorney for Appellant 
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